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INTRODUCTION
Although they line up so nicely in the Bill of Rights, our
constitutional rights have been seen brawling like gladiators, and not
infrequently. Almost always on the scene, and frequently starting the
fight, is the First Amendment. From campaign contributions to
prayer in schools to political protest, free speech promises to take on
anyone—privacy, public order, even the now-ubiquitous national
security.
*
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In the 1990s one volatile forum for this debate was demonstration
at health care clinics where abortions were performed.
Demonstrators sometimes threatened, harassed, and assaulted
patients, visitors, and staff, while at other times they simply handed
out leaflets and asked people passing to listen for a moment. Many of
those “people passing” experienced demonstration activity as a
violation of their Constitutional rights to privacy, medical treatment,
and practicing their livelihood. Some asked for the courts’ help in
protecting their rights.
As the demonstrations became more
dramatic, a difficult and lengthy battle began to play itself out in the
courts and in the legislatures. Legislatures enacted laws and courts
granted injunctions. Difficult cases retooled constitutional analysis as
we sought to balance our rights.
Until Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., both statutes and
injunctions that restricted speech faced the same level of
constitutional scrutiny: intermediate scrutiny.1 However, a series of
difficult cases involving injunctions led the U.S. Supreme Court to
conclude in Madsen that speech-restrictive injunctions should face
stricter scrutiny than statutes.2 After Madsen and its progeny, an
injunction must “burden no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant government interest.”3 Though the Court attempted to
resolve the problems of conflicting rights, Madsen raised a whole new
set of challenges: are speech-restrictive injunctions necessarily
content-based? Who can be enjoined? Are injunctions really
deserving of higher scrutiny than statutes? Can the reviewing court
raise government interests that the government has not pled, and
what function can those state interests play in the analysis? What
factual findings are necessary to support a speech-restrictive
injunction? In short, how is it possible for a court to craft an
injunction that protects listeners, protesters, and the Constitution
itself?4
This Paper will examine these dilemmas. Part I assesses the preMadsen state of injunctive relief in cases involving free speech.5 Part
1. See 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (evaluating whether an injunction requiring a
buffer zone between public demonstrations and an abortion clinic “passes muster
under the First Amendment”).
2. See id. at 764-65 (justifying a more stringent review—strict scrutiny—based on
the fact that judges can tailor injunctions to provide more targeted restraint of
speech).
3. Id. at 765.
4. See id. at 764 (noting that injunctions are court-created solutions aimed at
halting specific violations).
5. See infra Part I (providing a background as to how courts issue injunctions
restricting speech).
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II traces the rise through the lower courts of the two most important
Supreme Court decisions on this point: Madsen and Schenck v. ProChoice Network of Western New York.6 Part III addresses the
questions raised above, as analyzed in Madsen, Schenck, and a more
recent case involving statutory restrictions on speech, Hill v.
Colorado.7
I. PRE-MADSEN ANALYSIS OF SPEECH-RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTIONS AND
STATUTES
Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy that can have prohibitory
and/or mandatory effects, meaning it can prohibit or require certain
activities, or both.8 Most injunctions are prohibitory, and thus forbid
the enjoined party from an act that harms another.9 While generally
a matter of judicial discretion, because of the potentially sweeping
coverage of injunctive relief, that discretion is not absolute and is
subject to general principles governing equitable remedies.10
Accordingly, when crafting an injunction, a court should consider
such equitable issues as irreparable injury and lack of an adequate
remedy at law.11
Injunctions that restrict free speech are subject to constitutional
challenge because they put the government’s weight behind that
restriction: a court orders it, and state officers enforce it.12 When an
injunction will limit the enjoined party’s free speech, it is subject to
the same analysis as a statute or ordinance that restricts free speech.13
6. See 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (upholding an injunction that created a fixed “buffer
zone” around an abortion clinic); infra Part II (analyzing examples of cases where
courts have issued injunctions restricting speech).
7. See 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (affirming the validity of a Colorado statute that had
the effect of prohibiting abortion protesters from coming within eight feet of patients
entering and exiting an abortion clinic); infra Part III (analyzing specific cases in
issuance of injunctions).
8. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “injunction” as “[a]
court order prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding
someone to undo some wrong or injury”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 788 (7th
ed. 1999) (listing types of injunctions including mandatory (“orders an affirmative act
or mandates a specified course of conduct”) and preventive (“designed to prevent a
loss or injury in the future”)).
9. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759 (forbidding abortion protestors from taking
various actions).
10. See State Corp. Comm’n of Kan. v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 568 (1934)
(stating that courts should not grant injunctions “unless necessary to protect rights
against injuries otherwise irremediable”).
11. See, e.g., id. at 561.
12. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 770 (demonstrating the government’s high
level of commitment to enforcing an injunction). Where a narrower injunction has
failed to provide relief, a court may extend or broaden the original injunction. Id.
13. See id. at 765 (requiring courts to test whether the injunction burdens “no
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That analysis initially turns on whether the injunction or law is
“content-based,” i.e., based on the speech’s content, or “contentneutral,” i.e., made without reference to speech’s content.14 The type
of forum (public or private) in which the speech takes place and the
public and private interests the injunction is supposed to address are
also important factors.15 Depending on how the reviewing court uses
that analytical framework, a pre-Madsen injunction or law must pass
either “intermediate scrutiny,” as delineated by Ward v. Rock Against
Racism16 or “strict scrutiny,” as described in Carey v. Brown.17
A content-neutral injunction or law is one made “without reference
to the content of the regulated speech.”18 Pre-Madsen, if a court
found an injunction to be content-neutral, it had to pass
“intermediate scrutiny,” under which restrictions on the time, place,
and manner of speech were lawful as long as they were narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open
ample alternative channels of communication.19 In contrast, if a
court found an injunction to be content-based (made with reference
to the speech’s content), the injunction had to pass “strict scrutiny”: it
had to be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly
drawn to achieve that interest.20
Once content-neutrality is assessed, the court must analyze the
nature of the place where the speech occurs.21 Courts are highly
protective of demonstration in a public forum regarding matters of

more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest”).
14. See id. at 762 (assessing whether the injunction in question was “content or
viewpoint based”).
15. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 796 (1989). The
Supreme Court is divided on whether the Ward language, although the most
common statement of the test, is the primary test, the only test, or only one of several
tests that should be used in deciding content neutrality. Id. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at
746 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (scrutinizing whether an ordinance was narrowly
drawn to achieve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative
channels of communication).
17. See 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) (determining whether a statute was necessary
to serve a “substantial” state interest and was finely tailored to achieve that end).
18. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
19. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) (noting that courts would uphold restrictions on the time, place, and manner
of the speech if they were tailored narrowly to serve a significant government interest
and left open ample alternative channels of communication).
20. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 461-62 (applying strict scrutiny to an Illinois statute).
21. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
799-800 (1985) (recognizing the “Combined Federal Campaign” as a public forum
under First Amendment analysis).
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public concern and generally will only uphold content-neutral
restrictions in such a venue.22 In numerous cases, the Court has
reiterated that streets and sidewalks are the “classic” public fora.23
The court then must consider the nature of the interest the state is
asserting in seeking to enjoin the speakers.24 Courts have found that
protecting public safety, ensuring order,25 providing law enforcement
officials with clear instructions,26 and protecting patients’ rights to
seek medical treatment27 all constitute valid state interests.28
One major difficulty starts at the very base of the issue: what is
“speech?” Is conduct “speech?” Can it become “speech?” Or is
conduct merely the manner in which “speech” takes place?
Separating “speech” from “conduct,” or even protected speech from
unprotected, has a long and controversial history.29 Courts have been
willing to enjoin even peaceful protest activity when it occurs in a
pervasive violent context.30 For example, in a labor dispute that gave
rise to window smashing, explosions, stench bombs, vandalism, and
several severe beatings, the Court enjoined all the protesters,31 while
22. See id. at 800 (declaring that the principal purpose of traditional public fora
is the free exchange of ideas).
23. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1988) (noting that streets
and sidewalks are held in trust for the use of the public).
24. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (noting that a court may not prohibit all
communicative activity).
25. See, e.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Ass’n Union of Chicago, Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 317 (1941) (noting that courts have great
authority to protect against threats to public safety).
26. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 750 (noting that courts seek to prevent conduct that
strangles effective law enforcement).
27. See, e.g., id. (noting the state’s interest in promoting the health and safety of
its citizenry).
28. See id.; see also Milk Wagon Drivers Ass’n Union of Chicago, Local 753, 312
U.S. at 317 (recognizing several threats to public safety where states have an interest
in protecting its citizenry). This is not an exhaustive list, but in the abortion context
(and the cases cited in this Paper) these interests are the most frequently asserted by
the government.
29. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969) (protecting a student’s wearing of a black arm band in protest of the Vietnam
War).
30. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., v. Am. Coalition
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2637
(2003) (discussing incitement to violence in the abortion context). In Planned
Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit held that it was proper for a court to consider the
context in which the statement was made when determining whether a statement
constituted a “true threat.” Id. at 1063. The court found that publishing wild-weststyle “Wanted” flyers that gave pictures, names, and addresses of doctors who
performed abortions comprised a “true threat,” given the “whole factual context,”
including the recent murders of several doctors who performed abortions. Id.
31. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, 312 U.S. at 292, 298-99
(issuing an injunction to protect against continuing intimidation).
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noting that such an injunction would only be proper if the violence
truly “colored the entire collective effort” and not merely “the
conduct of some of the [defendants].”32 The Court has also
recognized that the government can regulate speech more strictly in
certain locations, such as in front of a person’s home33 or at a
workplace.34
Courts do not protect violence in the context of protest.35
However, courts may protect speech that is considered merely
“coercive,”36 “embarrassing,”37 or “intimidating.”38 The difficulty
ensues from deciding where coercion ends and violence begins. Thus
the problem in the context of abortion protest: is it violence for a
protester to use tactics that inflict upon the listener the risk of medical
harm?
II. MAKING THE CHANGE
A. Madsen in the Courts Below
In September 1992, a Florida state court entered a permanent
injunction restricting the anti-abortion protests of several groups and
individuals (“the Madsen defendants”) at a clinic in Melbourne,
Florida.39 The injunction barred the Madsen defendants from
32. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982).
33. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 (noting that such people cannot avoid the
objectionable speech).
34. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 290 F.3d at 1058
(finding it persuasive that several doctors had been murdered after their pictures
were posted on the Internet and in other protest group publications). Whether a
reproductive health facility could use this “pervasive violence” argument is as yet
untested but it is certainly arguable. Abortion protest, in the 1990s at least, occurred
in a nationwide context of extreme violence—doctors were assassinated in their
homes, clinic staff received death threats, facilities were bombed, and physical
altercations broke out at facilities. Even today, that pervasive violence still persists. In
Planned Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit held that a protest group’s posting of, among
other items, Wild West style “Wanted” ads displaying physicians names, pictures, and
home addresses constituted a true threat of violence, not merely advocacy of violence,
and was, therefore, proscribable.
35. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 887 (choosing not to impose damages for the
consequences of violent conduct).
36. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at
1082 (recognizing anti-abortion placards as protected by the First Amendment).
37. See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 910 (noting that the First
Amendment protects speech that amounts to mere social pressure or the threat of
social ostracism).
38. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at
1063 (noting that the First Amendment protects posters that are intimidating).
39. See Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 (Fla.
1993).
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blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic and from
physically abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic.40 Six
months later, the parties who had sought the injunction moved to
broaden it.41 During the hearing on that motion, the court found
that, despite the first injunction, the Madsen defendants continued to
impede access to the clinic by congregating in the street leading to
the clinic, marching in the clinic’s driveways, singing, chanting, and
using loudspeakers and bullhorns.42 The court also heard evidence
showing that the protests took a physical toll on persons entering the
clinic, some of whom were expecting surgery and accordingly were
placed at greater risk during surgical procedures because of
hypertension, anxiety, and the resulting need to undergo heavier
sedation.43
The court then held that its original injunction had not been
sufficient to protect the “health, safety and rights”44 of area women
and expanded the injunction to enjoin the defendants from entering
the premises and property of the clinic, interfering with access to or
exit from the clinic buildings and property, entering within thirty-six
feet of the clinic property line, making sounds audible from inside the
clinic during surgical and recovery periods (7:30 am to noon, Monday
through Saturday), displaying images observable from inside the
clinic at those same times, physically approaching anyone within 300
feet of the clinic unless that person indicated a desire to
communicate, touching or harassing patients and staff, and inciting
others to violate the injunction.45
The Madsen defendants appealed, and the state appellate court
certified the case for immediate review in the Florida Supreme Court,
which upheld the injunction.46 The court recognized that the areas
in which defendants were protesting, a public street and sidewalks,
were traditional public fora.47 The court also found the injunction to
be content-neutral because it regulated only “when, where, and how
40. See id. at 667 n.1 (indicating that the injunction barred numerous activities).
41. See id. at 667 (noting that the injunction did not adequately protect the
health and safety of women using the abortion clinic).
42. See id. at 667-68 (explaining in detail the actions of the defendants that
harmed the women in their use of the abortion clinic).
43. See id. at 668 (describing the trauma associated with “running the gauntlet”
to enter the abortion clinic).
44. Id. at 667.
45. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759-62 (narrowing the permitted behavior in front of
the abortion clinic).
46. Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 682.
47. See id. at 671.
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Operation Rescue may speak, not what it may say. The restrictions
make no mention whatsoever of abortion or any other political or
social issue . . . .”48 The court then held that the injunction’s
provisions were reasonable to protect significant government interests
in ensuring public safety, the free flow of traffic, and a woman’s right
to seek medical services.49
Shortly before the Florida Supreme Court ruled, the Eleventh
Circuit heard a separate challenge to the same injunction and struck
the injunction down, finding that it was indeed content-based and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.50 The Eleventh Circuit noted that
a 1988 Ninth Circuit opinion upheld a similar injunction, which
limited demonstrating, distributing literature, shouting, screaming,
chanting, or yelling by anti-abortion organizations and “those acting
in concert with them.”51 The Eleventh Circuit understood the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning to be that the injunction was content-neutral
because it did not mention viewpoint, but only limited the manner of
expression.52
The court found that reasoning “not at all
persuasive . . . [An injunction like the one at bar] is no more
viewpoint-neutral than one restricting the speech of ‘the Republican
Party, the state Republican Party, George Bush, Bob Dole, Jack Kemp,
and all persons acting in concert or participation with them or on
their behalf.’”53
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Madsen to resolve
the conflict between the Florida Supreme Court and the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals on whether the injunction was contentneutral or content-based.54 The Court ruled in Madsen that the
injunction was in fact content-neutral, and that content-neutral,
speech-restrictive injunctions should be judged by a new standard:
they must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant government interest.55
48. Id.
49. See id. at 672.
50. See Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 711 (11th Cir. 1993) (requiring a
compelling state interest that is narrowly drawn).
51. See id. at 710 n.10 (quoting Portland Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v.
Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988)).
52. See id. (observing that the Ninth Circuit’s decision focused neither on the
advocates’ viewpoints nor the “general issues raised at their demonstrations”).
53. Id. at 710 n.10, 711.
54. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762.
55. See id. at 776 (upholding the Florida Supreme Court’s noise restrictions and
“buffer zones” at clinic entrances but striking as unconstitutional the “buffer zone”
that extended to private property abutting abortion clinics, the “images observable”
provision, the “300-foot no approach zone,” and the “300-foot no-approach zone
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B. Schenck in the Courts Below
While Madsen worked its way through the courts, another case was
traveling a similar path in New York. In 1990, a group of antiabortion activists (“Schenck respondents”) began planning large-scale
blockades of a number of clinic facilities in that state.56 Pro-Choice
Network of Western New York asked the district court for a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) prohibiting the respondents’ planned
blockades.57 That order was granted on September 27, 1990.58 The
district court found that in both “large-scale blockades” and in smaller
groups, the Schenck respondents consistently attempted to stop or
impede clinic operations by trespassing on the property and in the
clinic buildings themselves, crowding around cars, and congregating
in driveways and doorways, as well as approaching and speaking with
women entering the clinic, sometimes grabbing and yelling at them.59
The TRO barred the respondents from physically blockading the
clinics, physically abusing or tortiously harassing anyone entering or
leaving the clinics, or “demonstrating within fifteen feet of any
person” entering or leaving the clinics, with the exception that two
“sidewalk counselors” at a time could enter this “buffer zone” to have
a “conversation of a non-threatening nature” with persons entering or
leaving the clinics, but must “cease and desist” their activity once the
person indicated she did not wish to be “counseled.”60
Five civil contempt findings later, the TRO was converted into a
permanent injunction.61 There were several significant changes
between the TRO and the injunction. The injunction expanded the
fifteen-foot buffer zone around persons entering or leaving the clinic
to include “demonstrating within fifteen feet from either side or edge
of, or in front of, doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot
entrances, driveways and driveways entrances” of the clinics or “within
fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving” the
clinics.62 In addition, the “two sidewalk counselors” permitted by the
TRO to enter the buffer zone were required by the injunction to
around [staff] residences”); infra Part III.A.
56. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue Western New
York, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1423 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
57. Id. at 1417.
58. Id. at 1422.
59. Id. at 1423-27.
60. Id. at 1440-41.
61. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue Western New
York, 828 F. Supp. 1018, 1032 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
62. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 367 (referring to these buffer zones respectively as
“fixed buffer zones” and “floating buffer zones”).
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cease and desist and then move outside the fifteen-foot floating buffer
zone around persons entering or leaving the clinic.63 The Schenck
respondents challenged the so-called fixed and floating buffer zones
and the cease and desist requirement.64
In analyzing the respondents’ First Amendment challenge, the
district court found that the injunction was content-neutral because it
restricted only the “volume, location, timing and harassing and
intimidating nature of [respondents’] expressive speech.”65 The
district court cited three significant government interests justifying
the restriction on free speech: public safety; ensuring that abortions
are performed safely; and ensuring that a woman’s constitutional
right to travel and to choose to abort a pregnancy were not sacrificed
in the interest of respondents’ First Amendment rights.66
Two respondents sought review in the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.67 While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
decided Madsen.68 Applying the new Madsen test, the Court of
Appeals reversed the district court, but on rehearing en banc, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision and upheld the
injunction, with the majority of the judges closely tracking the district
court’s reasoning.69 Two respondents appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari.70
III. THE BIG ISSUES AND THE NEW TEST: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S
RULINGS IN MADSEN, SCHENCK, AND HILL
A. Are the Injunctions Content-Neutral?
On the threshold issue of content-neutrality, the Madsen
defendants argued that the state’s injunction was content-based
because it restricted only the speech of anti-abortion protesters.71
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on Ward and
noted that the test for content-neutrality is whether the government
has adopted a regulation of speech “without reference” to the content
63. Id. at 369.
64. Id. at 371.
65. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 799 F. Supp. at 1433.
66. Id.
67. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994).
68. 512 U.S. at 753.
69. Id.; Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 393
(2d Cir. 1995).
70. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 516 U.S. 1170 (1996).
71. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss2/2

10

Keast: Injunction Junction: Enjoining Free Speech After Madsen, Schenck,
KEAST.DOC

9/16/2004 1:54 PM

2004] ENJOINING FREE SPEECH AFTER MADSEN, SCHENCK, AND HILL 283
of the speech.72 Rehnquist reasoned that any injunction necessarily
applies only to a particular person or group and regulates the
activities of that group: “[t]he fact that the injunction covered people
with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the injunction
content or viewpoint based.”73 Rehnquist found that the state enacted
the broader injunction not because of the defendants’ message, but
because, in communicating that message, they repeatedly violated the
state court’s original order.74 He further found that the injunction’s
lack of prohibitions against pro-abortion demonstrators was explained
by the lack of violations by any such activists at the Melbourne clinic;
had pro-abortion activists violated the first order (in which case, oddly
enough, they would necessarily be “acting in concert with” the antiabortion protesters), presumably they would have been enjoined
under the expanded order.75
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the injunction was indeed
content-based.76 Scalia found that if, as the district court and the
majority argued,77 the injunction was designed to remedy past
violations and not to suppress a particular viewpoint, the injunction’s
coverage of others acting “in concert with” the named defendants
would only bind those who “did certain things.”78 Instead, Scalia
found, the injunctions bound those who said certain things: the
injunctions were “tailored to restrain persons distinguished, not by
proscribable conduct, but by proscribable views.”79 Scalia quoted the
record several times, including the trial judge’s statements that “in
concert with means in concert with those who had taken a certain
position in respect to the clinic, adverse to the clinic,”80 thereby
finding that “all those who wish to express the same views as the
named defendants are deemed to be ‘acting in concert or
participation.’”81
72. Id. at 763.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 795 (arguing that the injunction was tailored to restrict an entire
point of view, rather than particular conduct).
77. See id. at 762 (holding that as such, strict scrutiny should not be employed).
78. Id. at 796-97.
79. See Id.
80. Id. at 796.
81. Id. at 795. After several persons were arrested for walking within the thirty-sixfoot buffer zone, the court stated at a hearing for those individuals, “I understand . . .
[abortion-rights supporters] were also in the area . . . the Injunction did not pertain
to [them] because the word in concert with means in concert with those who had
taken a certain position.” One defendant asked the court if, when the injunction was
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Scalia found this to be the very essence of a content-based
restriction and a prior restraint: an infringement upon an individual’s
expressive conduct before the individual’s conduct has been found
unlawful.82 Scalia believed that while a speech-restrictive injunction
might not be designed to target a particular viewpoint, it easily could
be, and it would almost always have a greater impact on one side of a
debate.83 “The proceedings before us here illustrate well enough
what I mean. The injunction was sought against a single-issue
advocacy group by persons and organizations with a business or social
interest in suppressing that group’s point of view.”84
Using the same reasoning as the Madsen defendants, the Schenck
defendants argued the injunction against them was also contentbased. Again writing for the majority, Rehnquist dismissed this
contention.85 Rehnquist found that the Schenck injunction was
content-neutral for the same reason the Madsen injunction had
been—it was based not on the content of the speech, but on the
defendants’ past unlawful conduct.86 In his dissent, Scalia did not
address this issue. Most courts appear to regard this as a settled issue;
numerous cases have held that injunctions like those at issue in
Madsen and Schenck are content-neutral.87
Feeling freed up to examine the statutory field, the Court took
another crack at content-neutrality in Hill v. Colorado.88 Colorado
had enacted a state law making it a misdemeanor to “knowingly
approach another person within eight feet of such person, unless
issued, it was intended to apply only to anti-abortion demonstrators. The court
responded, “In effect, yes.” Id. at 795-96.
82. See id. at 797 (maintaining that such a restraint threatened the foundation of
First Amendment rights).
83. Id. at 793.
84. Id. While the point may be valid, it ignores the trial court’s errors in designing
the injunction. A poorly drawn, poorly interpreted, or poorly enforced injunction is
not necessarily content-based, even if its effect is felt more strongly by one side.
Neutral drafting and neutral enforcement should be the goal and would not be
difficult—if so instructed, police can easily arrest anyone trespassing in the buffer
zone, regardless of that person’s viewpoint or message.
85. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 384 (arguing protesters are being silenced due to a
difference of opinion with patients of the clinics).
86. See id. at 384-85 (pointing to past arrests for harassment).
87. See, e.g., National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (using the test in Madsen to uphold a permanent injunction
prohibiting activists from obstructing access to abortion clinic facilities); Lucero v.
Trosch, 121 F.3d 591 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Scott, 187 F.3d 282 (2nd Cir.
1999); United States v. Mahoney, 247 F.3d 279 (D.C. Cir. 2001); New York v. Spitzer,
273 F.3d 184 (2nd Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act is contentneutral).
88. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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such other person consents, for the purpose of . . . engaging in oral
protest, education, or counseling . . . within a radius of one hundred
feet from the entrance door to a health care facility.”89 A group of
anti-abortion activists sued, arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional on its face.90
The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the statute.91 The court
found that the statute was supported by significant government
interests in ensuring the safety and unobstructed access to patients
and staff entering and leaving health care facilities.92 Relying on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Madsen, the court reasoned that the
statute was content-neutral because “the specific viewpoint of any
person who protests at a health care facility is not relevant to a
determination whether a violation of the statute has occurred.”93 The
statute also did not burden more speech than reasonably necessary
because protesters could still communicate with their targets at a
distance of eight feet: “Indeed, the restriction merely is directed at
depriving protesters of the opportunity to intimidate or make other
physical contact with the patients or staff.”94
The Hill protesters also argued that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague because the meaning of “knowingly
approach,” “consent,” “protests,” and “counseling and education” was
unclear.95 The court found it sufficient to give the legal definition of
“knowingly” and to finish up by applying the “common sense
meaning” of the remaining terms (with assistance from Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary).96
In the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Scott threw a wrench into
the relevant jurisprudence, opening his majority opinion by stating
that the case required a determination of “whether a legislative
enactment designed to protect the privacy rights of citizens . . . unduly
burdens the First Amendment rights of other citizens.”97 While citing
89. Id. at 708.
90. See id. (contending that the injunction created a chill on their First
Amendment rights).
91. See id. at 711.
92. Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670, 674 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding
a statute requiring protesters to stay at least eight feet away from patients of a health
care facility).
93. Id. at 673.
94. Id. at 674.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1247-48 (Colo. 1999). The district court had
also discussed a “right to be let alone,” but the appellate court ignored this thorny
problem. Id. at 1259.
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the statute’s stated purpose of protecting a citizen’s right to seek and
obtain medical counseling and treatment,98 Justice Scott placed this
right under the broader “right to privacy” first mentioned by Justice
Brandeis in an 1890 article and used as the basis for the decision in
Roe v. Wade.99 Justice Scott gave a fairly in-depth treatment of the
right to privacy but he appeared wary of relying on it, instead basing
his opinion on the state interest in protecting a citizen’s “health and
safety.”100
Using Ward as its map, the Colorado Supreme Court found the
statute content-neutral because it “serve[d] purposes unrelated to the
content of expression.”101 The Court then held the statute was
constitutional because it was narrowly tailored.102 Justice Scott noted
that in Ward, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that to be narrowly
tailored, a statute need not be “‘the least intrusive means’ of achieving
the desired end.”103 The Court found that the statute left open
ample alternative channels of communication because the protesters
could still speak, they just had to speak from eight feet away; there was
nothing in the statute that would prohibit protesters from being seen
and heard by their target audience.104
The Hill protesters appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Writing
for the majority, Justice Stevens, under the Ward analysis, tested the
statute by whether “the government ha[d] adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it convey[ed].”105
Stevens found that the statute at issue was content-neutral under the
Ward test for three reasons. First, it was not a “regulation of
speech.”106 Rather, it [was] a regulation of the places where some
speech may occur.107 Second, the regulation was not adopted

98. Id. at 1253.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1251. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Madsen was a precursor
for this logic; the court used the government’s interest in protecting residential
privacy in Frisby and found that medical privacy is an analogous government interest.
Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 672. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Madsen cites Roe v. Wade for the proposition that protection of the freedom to seek
lawful medical counseling and services is a legitimate government interest. Madsen,
512 U.S. at 767-68.
101. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d at 1256 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
102. Id. at 1257.
103. Id. at 1256.
104. Id. at 1259.
105. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
106. Id. at 719.
107. Id.
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“because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.”108
Third, the State’s interests in protecting access and privacy, and
providing the police with clear guidelines, are unrelated to the
content of the demonstrators’ speech.109
Petitioners argued that since the statute would only cover those
engaged in “protest, education, or counseling,” enforcing it would
require analyzing the speech involved to assess whether it fit those
categories, thus making the statute content-based.110 Stevens noted
that the kind of conduct that is the focus of the statute could in all
probability be identified as that conduct without reference to the
actual message being conveyed—if a person approaches someone
with a leaflet, they are probably counseling, educating, or
protesting.111
Stevens also noted that examining the content of a message in
order to determine the speaker’s purpose is not unusual, as is the case
in assessing “fighting words,” criminal threats, or a contractual
offer.112 Further, Stevens argued, the “theoretical” examination
necessary would be cursory, and it would be supported by precedents
that barred “picketing” and allowed examination of the speaker’s
behavior to analyze whether she was indeed “picketing.”113
Stevens saw the statute as “a minor place restriction on an extremely
broad category of communications with unwilling listeners.”114
108. Id.
109. Id. at 719-20.
110. Id. at 720.
111. Id. at 721.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 722.
114. See id. at 723 (explaining that abortion protestors, like used car salesmen and
fundraisers, are subject to the same eight foot restriction when presenting their
message to unwilling listeners). In several places in his argument, Stevens noted the
difference between “willing” and “unwilling” listeners. See, e.g., id. at 715-16 (stating
that the statute in question deals only with the interests of unwilling listeners).
Stevens relied on earlier cases to remind us that a “captive audience,” with little or no
opportunity to avoid the offensive speech, has slightly more rights, and the speaker to
the captive audience has slightly less. See id. at 718 (referring to a balancing test of
First Amendment rights of speakers and privacy rights of unwilling listeners (citing
Erznoznik v. Jacksonwille, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975))). Scalia wrote in dissent that he
failed to see how someone walking quickly past a demonstrator on a public sidewalk
was a captive audience, but this ignores the reality of the situations that have given
rise to the need for these kinds of injunctions and statutes. See id. at 753 n.3 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Scalia’s point (that if protecting access is the real goal, the statute’s
specific prohibition of blocking or impeding access is sufficient to reach it) is a good
one, but it ignores the state’s interest in protecting a patient’s health, which can be
jeopardized by a particularly distressing, face to face encounter with someone calling
them a murderer, for example. See id. at 755. It also ignores the reality, for many
reasons beyond the scope of this paper, that women and men may perceive what
constitutes “blocking” or “impeding” differently. A small woman may find the
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Souter concurred and added that restrictions solely upon the
“circumstances of its delivery” were suitable for testing under Ward
unless they effectively removed a subject or viewpoint from discourse,
which they did not in this case.115
Dissenting again, Scalia (presumably by accident) apparently begins
to give some credence to the idea that abortion is different.116 When
assessing the rights of those seeking medical services, Scalia examines
only the text of the statute and refuses to speculate about the effect of
the text on the reality of abortion protest.117 But, when assessing the
rights of those demonstrating at medical facilities, Scalia repeatedly
decries the majority’s practice of ignoring reality:118 whatever a
statute’s text may say, and however content neutral it may appear,
“[w]hen applied, as it is [in Hill], at the entrance to medical facilities,
it is a means of impeding speech against abortion.”119
To Scalia, then, even an injunction that purports to cover everyone
(by failing to be more specific) will really only cover some people. So,
how about a statute that does attempt to be more specific? Finding
validity in both the text of the statute and the reality in which it was
enacted, CF&I Steel v. United Steel Workers of America assesses
content-neutrality by examining both.120 Colorado’s Labor Peace Act
“dogging” referred to by Stevens to be a block or an impediment when it is
performed by a person larger than herself, especially a man. See id. at 718. Kennedy
argued in concurrence that a statute becomes unconstitutionally content-based
because of its application to the specific locations where it occurs. See id. at 767
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Stevens replied that “[a] statute making it a misdemeanor
to sit at a lunch counter for an hour without ordering any food would also not be
‘content based’ even if it were enacted by a racist legislature that hated civil rights
protesters.” Id. at 724.
115. Id. at 735-36 (referring to the government’s ability to make restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of protected speech). Souter goes on to make a pleasantly
concise statement about the content-neutrality problem at issue in this case: “There is
always a correlation with subject and viewpoint when the law regulates conduct that
has become the signature of one side of a controversy. But that does not mean that
every regulation of such distinctive behavior is content based as First Amendment
doctrine employs that term.” Id. at 737.
116. See id. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court would have
decided that the regulation was content-based had the issue been anti-war rather than
anti-abortion protests). Scalia charges that the Court’s jurisprudence shifts when it
considers the abortion issue. Id.
117. See id. at 749 (comparing the interest that the State of Colorado sought to
protect as stated in the text of the statute with the interest that the Court announced
it was protecting, which was not derived from the text of the statute).
118. See, e.g., id. at 756 (asserting that the Court displays a “willful ignorance” of
the kinds of communication the statute restricts).
119. Id. at 744 (supporting his position that the statute is content-based). In a
separate dissent, Kennedy follows a similar “reality based” argument and finds that the
statute’s coverage of only the entrances to “medical facilities” makes it, in effect,
content-based. Id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
120. See 23 P.3d 1197, 1202 (Colo. 2001) (determining that the Colorado statute
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prohibited picketing in residential areas about labor disputes.121 The
lower court issued an injunction barring the defendants from
residential picketing and held that the defendants had violated the
Act.122 The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the statute was
content-based because, by its own terms, the statute only barred
speech concerning labor disputes.123
Between CF&I Steel and Hill, it is clear that adherence to Scalia’s
analysis of content-neutrality would likely render every speechrestrictive statute and injunction content-based, as Rehnquist noted in
Madsen.124 An injunction is always ordered in response to the
activities of an individual or group; under Scalia’s analysis, this would
render it necessarily content-based and would also render it void for
over-inclusiveness.125 But a court could also not order an injunction
that specifically identifies that group by referring to the viewpoint or
content the group shares because such a reference would make the
injunction facially invalid according to CF&I Steel.126 Under the logic
of CF&I Steel and Hill, laws barring solicitation of campaign
contributions outside a polling place would be necessarily contentbased and would have to pass strict scrutiny.127 Presumably, Scalia
was content-based because it distinguished between lawful and unlawful picketing
based on the subject matter of the picket). The court’s reference to context seems to
suggest that it is proper to look beyond the statute’s terms in analyzing contentneutrality, but the court did not explain what it meant by “context” and specifically
stated that the statute was “facially invalid.” Id. Why a reviewing court would need to
examine the “context” if the statute is invalid on its face is unclear.
121. 3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-3-108(2)(a) (2000).
It is an unfair labor practice for an employee, individually or in concert with
others, to . . . coerce or intimidate an employee in the enjoyment of his legal
rights . . . or to intimidate his family or any member thereof, picket his
domicile, or injure the person or property of such employee or his family or
of any member thereof. . . .
§ 8-3-108(2)(a).
122. See CF&I Steel, 23 P.3d at 1198 (finding, however, that the union had not
authorized or condoned the acts of the individual picketers).
123. Id. at 1202 (rejecting the argument that Colorado common law gave courts
the power to regulate all residential picketing).
124. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762 (explaining that all injunctions enjoin specific
groups based on past acts which may naturally correspond to the group’s message).
125. See id. at 794 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the true vice of contentbased legislation is that it “lends itself to” rather than is “always” used to stifle a
specific group’s First Amendment rights).
126. See CF&I Steel, 23 P.3d at 1201-02 (deciding that an injunction was contentbased and therefore facially invalid because it enjoined only picketers involved in
labor disputes).
127. Cf. id. at 1202 (holding the injunction content-based because it only
prohibited speech related to labor disputes); Hill, 530 U.S. at 713 n.19 (affirming that
the statute was content-neutral because it only restricted time, place, and manner of
speech).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004

17

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
KEAST.DOC

290

9/16/2004 1:54 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 12:2

approved of the pre-Madsen tiered analysis; his opinions in this line of
cases are unclear as to whether he would advocate for the outcome
demanded by the logic of Hill and CF&I Steel.
B. Who Can be Enjoined?
Responding to Scalia’s argument in Madsen that the injunction was
content-based, Rehnquist, writing for the majority, states that if
seeking speech restrictive injunctions against particular issue groups
makes the injunctions content-based, then it would be virtually
impossible to craft an injunction that was content-neutral.128
Necessarily, then, it would also be virtually impossible to remedy the
unlawful conduct of protesters in an ongoing, fluid protest such as
that at a particular clinic.129 Under Scalia’s reasoning, a person
seeking an injunction to monitor the conduct of protesters would be
required to return to the court each time a new individual protester
appeared on the scene.130 Rehnquist’s argument is stronger, but
there is certainly a difficulty; it is somewhat troubling (and, some
courts would undoubtably hold, unlawful) to hold a person to the
standards of a court order of which she has no notice and in which
she was not named.131
For example, a New Jersey injunction restricted the protest activities
of an organization called “Helpers” and all those acting in concert
with it.132 Based on repeated violations of the order by a protester
128. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762 (explaining that an injunction against a specific
group is based on that group’s past actions in a real dispute). Scalia might think this
a good result; it is unclear why Rehnquist thinks it a bad one.
129. See id. at 763 (suggesting that it is the conduct of individual protestors at a
specific place, not the group’s views, that violate an injunction). Because the conduct
is what is enjoined by the injunction, not the views of the protestors, the court would
be unable to issue an injunction against recurring unlawful conduct at a specific place
because it would be construed as content-based. Id.
130. See Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 723 A.2d 611, 613 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) (asserting that injunctions would be rendered ineffective if groups
and individuals could avoid the injunction by sending new groups and individuals to
the site).
131. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Garibaldi, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46,
57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that notice is a requirement to include an individual
within the ambit of an injunction in which he is not named).
132. See Horizon Health Ctr., 723 A.2d at 611, 613 (noting that membership in
Helpers was not required for the injunction to apply). The New Jersey appellate
court overturned the lower court’s refusal to expand the injunction. Id. at 612. The
court found that “acting in concert or participation with” the enjoined parties meant
that the defendant knowingly violated the injunction’s provisions. Id. Therefore,
those participating with the parties to the injunction, with knowledge of the
injunction’s existence, were bound by the injunction as well. Id. at 613. The court
found that to be effective, the injunction had to be construed this way. Id. Adopting
the lower court’s interpretation would render the injunction useless because
protesters could not be restrained if the clinic could not meet the heavy burden of
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who did not belong to Helpers, the clinic asked the court to broaden
the injunction.133 The court refused to do so, holding that to
broaden the injunction against Helpers and those acting in concert
with it required plaintiffs to show the protester either belonged to
Helpers or was directed or assisted by its members.134
Can this problem be solved? In 1996, a California state court
enjoined an organization, one named respondent, and “all persons
acting in concert or participation with them, or either of them, and
all persons with actual notice of this Judgment” from various abortion
protest-related activities.135 In 2001, Planned Parenthood sought
declaratory relief to apply the injunction to protesters not named in
the original suit.136 Planned Parenthood alleged that, while not
named in the original injunction, the respondents had been served
with a copy of the injunction and therefore were bound by it.137
Planned Parenthood’s motion for summary judgment was granted.138
The First District appellate court overturned the ruling.139 The
appellate court found the notice provision was unconstitutional
because it sought to apply the injunction against anyone, not simply
those who acted “in concert with” the named defendants.140 The
court found that an injunction could only be enforced against the
person to whom it was directed, against a class of persons to which
that person belongs, or against someone aiding, abetting, or acting on
that person’s behalf.141 The court remanded the case for findings of
proving membership or direction by Helpers. Id. Each individual protester would
have to have an injunction specifically directed against her. Id. (stating that the
purpose of the injunction was to protect Horizon and its patients and not to punish
members of Helpers).
133. See id. at 612 (asking the court to include in the injunction “and/or persons
and organizations affiliated, acting in concert or participation with, or on behalf” of
Helpers).
134. See id. (reasoning that to do otherwise would violate the due process rights of
alleged, non-member violators).
135. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n. v. Operation Rescue, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736, 744
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming the fifteen-foot buffer zone at the clinic but reversing
the 250 feet zone at the doctor’s residence and the ban from approaching workers
and patients due to the availability of a less restrictive approach).
136. See Garibaldi, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (alleging that the defendants acted in
concert and participation with Operation Rescue).
137. See id. at 50-51 (arguing that actual notice of the injunction renders the
defendants bound by the injunction).
138. See id. at 51 (finding the defendants bound by the injunction as a matter of
law).
139. See id. at 57 (reviewing the lower court’s decision de novo).
140. See id. at 53-54 (stating that to apply an injunction to all anti-abortion
protestors, rather than basing it on an individual’s relationship to the enjoined party,
would render the injunction content-based and contrary to the First Amendment).
141. See id. at 52 (holding that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction and notice are not enough
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fact on whether other demonstrators did in fact act “in concert with”
the named defendants.142
The problem, of course, is that once a particular protester has been
specifically enjoined by name or by membership in an enjoined
organization, he may simply move on to another facility and be
replaced by another protester, who is free to act as she wants.143 The
petitioners will need to go back to court for each protester and prove
that protester’s link to the enjoined parties.144 Should petitioners
even have the time and resources for this, they will find it a further
challenge to prove that an injunction is even required: they would
have to come up with some kind of evidence to prove that the
individual protester would violate the party’s rights again.145
It would seem that, if Scalia’s argument were accepted, any number
of aggrieved parties could lose their right to seek redress in the courts,
and their only recourse would be to organize themselves into a group
large enough to encourage legislators to act. We saw the result of this
approach in Hill and CF&I Steel. Even if such a legislative enactment
could pass constitutional muster, it still would likely not address the
problem that the party seeking the injunction is being injured right
now and will continue to suffer injury until the legislative body acts.
Even were they successful, they would still have no private right of
action under statutes such as the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, and they would have to rely on government enforcers
to protect them.146

to subject a person to the restraint of an injunction”). “The order must be directed
against that person, either by naming that person as an individual or by designating a
class of persons to which that person belongs.” Id. (emphasis in original).
142. See id. at 57 (noting that although actual notice is not sufficient, it is still
required).
143. But see Madsen, 512 U.S. at 802-03 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
[T]he right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely
because some members of the group may have participated in conduct or
advocated doctrine that itself is not protected . . . . [M]ere association with
[a] group—absent a specific intent to further an unlawful aim embraced by
that group—is an insufficient predicate for liability.
Id. (quoting Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 925-26).
144. See, e.g., Garibaldi, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 57 (requiring proof of participation with
the named party and actual notice of the injunction).
145. See U.S. v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (mandating proof of a
“cognizable danger of recurrent violation” for the issuance of an injunction).
146. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(A) (1994) (providing a right of action to
individuals “obtaining or seeking to obtain” services in a facility). This requirement
eliminates the ability to sue after the individual received services at the facility. Id.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss2/2

20

Keast: Injunction Junction: Enjoining Free Speech After Madsen, Schenck,
KEAST.DOC

9/16/2004 1:54 PM

2004] ENJOINING FREE SPEECH AFTER MADSEN, SCHENCK, AND HILL 293

C. Should Speech-Restrictive Injunctions Receive Stricter Scrutiny
than Speech-Restrictive Laws?
After determining that the Madsen injunction was content-neutral,
Rehnquist garnered only four additional votes for his further
reasoning that an injunctive order should be judged by a slightly
stricter standard than an ordinance.147 Rehnquist found that
injunctions carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory
application.148 His rationale for this finding is not clearly set out, but
presumably, Rehnquist would argue that injunctions pose greater risks
to free speech because they are targeted toward particular entities and
particular speech, and they are brought by particular entities who feel
they have been injured.149 However, this danger would seem to be
(and is, to Stevens) mitigated by Rehnquist’s next observation: that
injunctions are usually designed to punish for a violation of a prior
law or court order.150 In contrast, a generally applicable ordinance
simply represents a legislative choice about promoting social
interests.151
In his partial concurrence, Scalia agreed with the outcome, but not
the reasoning: rather than articulating a new standard for contentneutral injunctions, Scalia argued, the Court should simply find that
injunctions like the one at bar are content-based and judge them
under strict scrutiny, thus avoiding the need for an entirely new tier of
scrutiny. 152 Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stevens
147. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 (concurring Justices included O’Connor,
Blackmun, Ginsburg, and Souter).
148. See id. (touching upon how injunctions lend themselves more to arbitrary
and unreasonable government than do statutes).
149. See id. (stating that “[t]here is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally”) (quoting
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)).
150. See id. at 765 (conceding that injunctions have some advantages over
statutes). This is troublesome language because in the theoretical case, no one
should be “punished” for exercising her constitutional rights. Compare id. at 794 n.1
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that restricting First
Amendment rights due to prior misconduct is an unprecedented form of
punishment), with id. at 778 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that deprivation of liberty is a “remedy” for prior misconduct and not a
form of punishment). The concept sounds less draconian in the case of Garibaldi, in
which the court asserts that the defendants are being enjoined because they abused
their rights previously. 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53.
151. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 (concluding that the ordinance poses more of a
danger to First Amendment rights).
152. See id. at 791-92 (claiming that the difference between intermediate scrutiny
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concurred with the holding that the injunction was contentneutral.153 He also agreed that injunctions should be subject to a
different standard of First Amendment scrutiny than should
ordinances.154 However, Stevens argued that injunctions should be
scrutinized more leniently, not more strictly.155
Stevens found that there were several significant differences
between statutes and injunctions that justified the use of a different
standard. First, while statutes were imposed on large groups of
people, injunctions applied “solely to an individual or a limited group
of individuals who, by engaging in illegal conduct, have been
judicially deprived of some liberty—the normal consequence of illegal
activity.”156 Second, under equitable principles an injunction must be
carefully crafted by the judiciary to address the specific activities that
justify it; Stevens argued that a more lenient standard should
therefore be used in order to give deference to the issuing court’s
more intimate knowledge of those specific facts.157
Scalia disagreed with using a more lenient standard because of
deference to the trial court, but he indicated that an injunction does
necessitate different treatment than a law.158 In his dissent he stated,
“the judicial creation of a [zone] in which only a particular group,
which had broken no law, cannot exercise its rights of speech” is at
odds with the First Amendment and the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence (emphasis added).159
While the differentiation
between law-breakers and those who have not broken any law is
and the new test created by the Court was “frankly too subtle for me to describe”).
Scalia deemed the new standard “intermediate-intermediate scrutiny.” Id. at 791.
153. See id. at 782 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joining
part II of the majority opinion).
154. See id. at 778 (framing the issue as comparing “generally applicable
legislation” as “judicial remedies for proven wrongdoing”).
155. See id. (basing this conclusion on a judge’s ability to sanction a repeat
offender by way of injunction the way a legislator could not sanction the community
at large by statute).
156. Id. (concluding that while an ordinance restricting protest may be
unconstitutional, an injunction for the same acts may be valid). The Garibaldi court
also relied on this reasoning: “Indeed, [an injunction] may ‘deprive the enjoined
parties of rights others enjoy precisely because the enjoined parties have abused those
rights in the past.’” 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52 (quoting People v. Conrad, 64 Cal. Rptr.
2d 248, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
157. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 779 (applying the facts of the case where the trial
judge heard three days of testimony before rendering a decision).
158. See id. at 793 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that a lower court’s permanent or expanded injunctions should be closely scrutinized
because the court, when expanding the order or making it permanent, will be angry
with respondents/defendants for defying its previous orders).
159. See id. at 785 (introducing the main theme of his dissent).
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dictum, it suggests at least some agreement with Stevens’ viewpoint.160
This viewpoint would indicate that injunctions issued in response to
violations of laws such as the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act (“FACE”) should receive more lenient scrutiny, not
stricter scrutiny.161
Scalia’s argument for strict scrutiny is attractive, if only because it
refuses to further muddy the waters on this point. Deciding what level
of scrutiny to apply is often somewhat arbitrary, as this case shows.162
Nevertheless, Stevens’ logic is more persuasive because it seems
antithetical to provide greater protection to those who have already
abused their rights.163 Hill makes this clear; the statute at issue in that
case places quite extensive and complicated restrictions on people
who have not yet demonstrated that they cannot exercise their rights
without trampling on someone else’s.164 It is difficult to comprehend
how this is less troubling than an injunction targeted against
particular individuals.
160. Compare id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(asserting that injunctions apply to those who have engaged in past illegal conduct),
with id. at 785 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claiming that
groups do not break the law by asserting their First Amendment rights).
161. For cases analyzing injunctions issued pursuant to FACE, 18 U.S.C. § 248
(1994), see, e.g., U.S. v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 927 (8th Cir. 1996) (employing the
Madsen standard of scrutiny to find part of the injunction violated the First
Amendment); Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 605-07 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming a
twenty-five foot buffer zone from the clinic and reversing a 100 foot zone from the
doctor’s residence and a floating twenty foot buffer from the doctor’s person); U.S. v.
Scott, 187 F.3d 282, 287 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming an expanded buffer zone due to
repeated violations of the first injunction by the defendant); U.S. v. Mahoney, 247
F.3d 279, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (vacating as overbroad an injunction that prohibited
defendants from going within twenty feet of any reproductive health facility within
the Capital Beltway); New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue, 273 F.3d 184, 203
(2d Cir. 2001) (holding an injunction violates First Amendment rights because it was
broader than necessary to address the state’s interests); Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th
Cir. 2002) (upholding an injunction as not infringing upon First Amendment rights
that prohibited defendants from threatening plaintiff doctors through “wanted”
posters).
162. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (describing the difficulty in applying the new and ill-defined standard put forth
by the majority).
163. See id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (basing a
lesser standard of scrutiny on a judge’s ability and power to determine individual
culpability).
164. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999).
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such
person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest,
education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or
sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to
a health care facility.
§ 18-9-122(3).
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D. Can the Court Assume State Interests that Haven’t Been Pled, and
What Role Can Those Interests Play?
In Madsen, Rehnquist noted that the Florida Supreme Court found
that the state had a strong interest in protecting a woman’s freedom
to seek lawful medical services relating to her pregnancy.165 The state
also had interests in maintaining public safety and order, keeping
traffic moving on public streets and sidewalks, and protecting citizens’
property rights.166 Rehnquist held those state interests “quite
sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to protect
them.”167 The defendants in Schenck argued that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to injunctive relief because the plaintiffs did not identify
any state interests in their pleading.168 Rehnquist stated that “in
assessing a First Amendment challenge, a court looks not only at the
private claims asserted in the complaint, but also inquires into the
governmental interests that are protected by the injunction, which
may include an interest in public safety and order.”169 The Court
held that, given its factual similarity to Madsen, the Schenck
injunction was justified by the same governmental interests: ensuring
public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets
and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman’s
freedom to seek pregnancy related medical services.170
Scalia dissented.171 The Court’s “opinion . . . claims for the
judiciary a prerogative I have never heard of: the power to render
decrees that are in its view justified by concerns for public safety,
though not justified by the need to remedy the grievance that is the
subject of the lawsuit.”172 Scalia acknowledged that some remedial
options were eliminated in Madsen because of public safety concerns,
but he found that to be quite different from the Court’s action in
Schenck, in which, he argued, public safety provided part of the
justification for the remedy itself and was not merely a tool for setting
165. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 767-68 (listing the various significant governmental
interests protected by the injunction).
166. Id. at 768.
167. Id.
168. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 374 (claiming, therefore, that only one of seven
claims survived the lower court’s decision).
169. Id. at 375 (concluding that a plaintiff need not plead the state interest in the
complaint).
170. See id. at 376 (comparing violations of private rights with violations of public
order). The latter is a public right enforced by the state and therefore plaintiffs do
not need to allege it in the complaint. Id.
171. Id. at 385-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joining Justice
Scalia were Justices Kennedy and Thomas).
172. Id. at 385-86 (introducing the main reason for his dissent).
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the scope of that remedy.173
As he did in Madsen, Scalia debated whether any law had actually
been violated which would thus justify injunctive relief.174 Scalia
disagreed with the District Court’s assertion that the Schenck
plaintiffs’ injunction was justified because they were likely to succeed
on the merits of their claims.175 In addition, Scalia again asserted that
the holdings of Claiborne require that when reviewing injunctions,
especially those restricting free speech, a court must closely examine
the findings for support of those restrictions.176 Not only did the
Court abandon this duty, but, Scalia argued, Rehnquist substituted his
own assessments of past violations and future probabilities for those of
the lower court.177
Scalia found this particularly disturbing because of the privacy
rights relied upon by the lower court in crafting the injunction:178
while the injunction was nominally based on a (questionable) right to
unimpeded access to clinics, Scalia felt the District Court also
supported the injunction with a “generalized right ‘to be left
alone.’”179
In particular, Scalia found that the terms of the injunction “ma[d]e
no attempt to conceal” that the cease and desist provision, which
173. See id. at 393 (reasoning that the Court’s concern with public safety raised
separation of powers difficulties because the executive branch is charged with
protecting public safety).
174. Compare Madsen, 512 U.S. at 805-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in
part, dissenting in part) (explaining that the Court failed to explain how the
defendants violated a Florida law or injunction), with Schenck, 519 U.S. at 391-92
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (questioning the discriminatory
nature of the state trespassing law and rejecting the lower court’s determination
regarding the merits of the claim).
175. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 391-92 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (presenting contrary and controlling Supreme Court precedent).
176. See id. at 389-90 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (reciting
precedent requiring a speech-restrictive injunction to be “‘supported by findings that
adequately disclose their evidentiary basis . . . that carefully identify the impact of [the
defendants’] unlawful conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding the
imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected activity’” (quoting NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933-34 (1992))).
177. See id. at 389 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (rejecting
the Court’s analogy to the proposition that appellate courts can affirm trial courts on
different legal grounds).
178. See id. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (explaining
that the District Court was clear in upholding the injunction on the right to be left
alone rather than a right to unobstructed access to clinics).
179. Compare id. at 383 (stating that the lower court’s basis did not accurately
reflect Supreme Court precedent on a “right to be left alone”), with id. at 388-89
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (claiming that the Court ignored
the District Court’s basis for upholding the injunction: a nonexistent right to be left
alone).
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required “sidewalk counselors” to retreat outside the buffer zone if
the patient indicated she did not wish to be counseled, was based on a
supposed right to be left alone.180 Scalia felt the injunction could not
be analyzed without keeping that emphasis in mind, because “unduly
burdensome” is a balancing test assessed, in part, by the right the
restriction protects,181 and a “right” the Court has arguably
disclaimed should not be given much weight in that balancing.
The majority did denounce the concept of a “right to be left alone,”
but Scalia argued that it was impossible to reverse the lower court on
what he considered this central point and still find that the injunction
could pass the balancing test required by Madsen.182 Rather than
actually confront this issue, argued Scalia, Rehnquist made it
irrelevant by abdicating Claiborne’s requirement of reviewing the
facts, essentially by ignoring what the District Court actually found
and deciding what it was “entitled” to find, then upholding the
injunction on those grounds.183
An important theoretical issue raised by the Schenck opinion
involves the very nature of injunctive relief itself: whose interests are
being protected? Scalia argued in Schenck that the “Court’s
opinion . . . claims for the judiciary a prerogative I have never heard
of: the power to render decrees that are in its view justified by
concerns for public safety, though not justified by the need to remedy
the grievance that is the subject of the lawsuit.”184 Rehnquist
characterized Scalia’s opinion as arguing that reliance on “public
safety” is impermissible because only the government can seek an
injunction based on that factor.185 Rehnquist concluded that the
District Court had not used public safety itself as a justification for the

180. Id. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting the
District Court’s approval of such terms). The Colorado Supreme Court discussed a
“right to be let alone” wrapped in the right to privacy in its opinion in Hill, 973 P.2d
at 1253.
181. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765 (balancing speech restrictions by an
injunction and the significant governmental interests protected by the injunction).
182. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(explaining that the Madsen test to “burden no more speech than necessary” only
protects “legitimate governmental interests”) (emphasis in original).
183. See id. at 389 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (denouncing
the Court’s approach generally, but especially when it involves First Amendment
rights).
184. See id. at 385-86 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(recognizing a difference between eliminating remedies because of conflicts with
public safety and justifying a remedy on the basis of public safety).
185. See id. at 376 n.7 (discussing the difficulty a private individual has in alleging
violations of public rights).
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injunction, but simply as a factor in the constitutional analysis.186
Rehnquist has the stronger logic on this point. The District Court
did craft the injunction based both on plaintiffs’ private rights and on
public interests.187 However, it is solely the plaintiffs’ interests that
give rise to the need for relief.188 State interests are necessary to
constitutional analysis because the state will be enforcing the
injunction via the police and the courts.189 However, the state’s
interests, such as promoting the free flow of traffic, only affect the
scope and details of the injunction.190
If a restrictive injunction were necessary to afford plaintiff relief but
the state had no interest in enforcing the injunction, it is probable
that the injunction would not be enforced. The plaintiff, therefore,
could only be effectively protected if the state decided to sue, not in
the plaintiff’s interest, but in the public interest.191 Political pressure,
as well as scarce resources, could severely limit the state’s ability to do
so in all but the most exceptional cases.192 As a result, a potentially
very large group of individual plaintiffs would be unable to protect
themselves from illegal activity.
The debate over state interests and their proper role raged on in
Hill. Stevens cited as the state’s interests in Hill one of those that the
Colorado Supreme Court relied on: protecting the health and safety
of the state’s citizens.193 Like the Colorado Supreme Court, Stevens
186. See id. (asserting that a court can rely on public safety to assess the First
Amendment argument).
187. See id. at 369 (holding the injunction served three significant governmental
interests: public safety, a woman’s constitutional rights to interstate travel, and a
woman’s constitutional rights to choose to have an abortion).
188. See id. at 362-67 (describing the acts of the defendants, including blockades
and attempts to disrupt clinic operations and client access, which led plaintiffs to take
action in the courts for relief).
189. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(requiring the state to show a compelling state interest before it could enforce a
content-based exclusion that could potentially violate First Amendment rights).
190. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376 (assessing whether the injunction was
appropriately tailored in light of the state’s stated interests).
191. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1994) (authorizing the
Attorney General to sue on behalf of individuals to advance the public interest of
school desegregation, which also enforces individual protections under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
192. See, e.g., U.S. v. Scott, 187 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding for the State on
behalf of the individual). In Scott, the state brought suit against the defendant. The
trial court found that Scott repeatedly used physical obstruction, threats, violence,
harassment, and sound amplification that made his voice audible inside the clinic. Id.
at 284. Police officers restrained Scott on twenty occasions and warned him not to
stand in the clinic’s doorways on forty or fifty occasions. Id. Between 1988 and 1996,
Scott was arrested fourteen times on charges including harassment and third-degree
assault. Id.
193. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 715 (balancing the petitioners’ First Amendment rights
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also referred to the controversial “right to be let alone” and stated
that one aspect of that right was “[t]he unwilling listener’s interest in
avoiding unwanted communication”194—terminology that came
about in Frisby, when protesters picketed a doctor’s residence.195
This proved too much for Scalia, who stated that as if it was not
enough for the Schenck Court to rely on interests the state had not
pled, the Court in Hill goes on to rely on an interest “not only
completely different from the interest that the statute specifically sets
forth; [but an interest] explicitly disclaimed by the State in its brief
before this Court, and characterized as a ‘straw interest’ petitioners
served up in the hope of discrediting the State’s case.”196 Scalia
reminded the Court that just three terms ago, in Schenck, the Court
expressed doubt that the concept of a right to be let alone was an
accurate understanding of First Amendment jurisprudence.197
Although Scalia’s frequently discourteous tone somewhat lessens
the thrill of supporting his logic, Scalia’s viewpoint is to be expected
and is not misplaced. The idea that a court should only decide the
issues before it is fundamental to American jurisprudence.198 In
many cases, interests, claims, and arguments not pled are expressly
waived.199 A reviewing court should be analyzing the issues the
parties thought were important, not those the court thinks are
important (or so the argument goes).200 However, while the
precision of this understanding of the court’s role makes it appealing,
against the legitimate state interests served by the statute). The Colorado Supreme
Court also relied on the state’s interest in protecting an individual’s “‘right to protest’
or counsel against certain medical procedures” and a person’s “right to obtain
medical counseling and treatment.” Id. at 712.
194. Id. at 716 (distinguishing between willing and unwilling listeners). These are
two radically different statements and Stevens would have done better to stick with
the latter version’s language because the dissenters seize upon the concept of a “right
to be let alone” and continue to address it with undisguised scorn. Id. at 741, 750
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (discussing the protection of the unwilling listener
as one aspect of residential privacy rights).
196. Hill, 530 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
197. See id. at 750-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of trying to find its
way out of a “jam”); see also supra note 171 (demonstrating the different analyses of
the Court and the dissenters in Schenck)
198. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 , cl. 1 (“judicial power shall extend to all Cases . . .
[and] Controversies.”).
199. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (requiring that any counterclaim rising out of
the same transaction or occurrence be filed or a defendant is waived from bringing it
in the same or subsequent cases).
200. See, e.g., Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27
FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 487 (1958) (“Our courts are passive instrumentalities, available
to right wrong, but the initiative is never theirs. Our courts require the catalyst of a
litigant who seeks relief.”).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss2/2

28

Keast: Injunction Junction: Enjoining Free Speech After Madsen, Schenck,
KEAST.DOC

9/16/2004 1:54 PM

2004] ENJOINING FREE SPEECH AFTER MADSEN, SCHENCK, AND HILL 301
it ignores reality. The decrial of “judicial activism,” in which courts
interpret laws using not only their literal text but a variety of factors,
such as evolving societal norms, is truly bipartisan: conservatives hold
up Roe v. Wade;201 liberals rally around Bush v. Gore.202
Nevertheless, even Scalia, who generally prefers to interpret the
meaning of the Constitution as the framers would have understood it,
finds it hard to resist the role of judicial activist.203 It would be
hypocritical to ignore this reality.204 If we must have courts engaging
in “activism,” it is better that they do so and acknowledge it, rather
than decry it and then take it up without apparent awareness of the
discredit such a turnaround casts on their positions.
E. How Much Deference to the Issuing Court’s Findings of Fact is
Appropriate?
One of the fundamental issues in the efficacy of the Madsen test is
revealed in the continuing debate between Rehnquist and Scalia and
addressed in Stevens’ concurrence: since an injunction must be
tailored carefully to address the facts, how closely is a reviewing court
supposed to look at those facts?205 Rehnquist’s opinions in Madsen
and Schenck both reveal substantial deference to the trial court;206
Scalia, on the other hand, argues that an almost de novo factual
review is demanded when the injunction restricts free speech.207
201. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (recognizing a woman’s right to choose to have an
abortion).
202. 531 U.S. 98, 105-10 (2000) (holding that the process for mandatory recounts
did not meet the non-arbitrary treatment of voters requirement under the Equal
Protection Clause); see also, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (2001) (questioning whether the five justices in the majority
ruled because they favored a Bush presidency).
203. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 111-22 (joining not only in the majority opinion,
but also joining Chief Justice Rehnquist in a concurring opinion in support of
additional reasons for reversing the decision of the Florida Supreme Court).
204. See William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism,
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1244 (accusing the Conservative Court of not engaging in
judicial activism but rather engaging in hypocrisy).
205. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (expressing his belief that a more lenient standard of review should govern First
Amendment challenges to injunctive relief than the standard applied to legislation).
206. See id. at 769-70 (reasoning that the trial court had greater knowledge of the
facts of the case and the background of the dispute); see also Schenck, 519 U.S. at
381 (deferring to the trial court’s assessment of the distance needed to keep
entrances to the clinics clear).
207. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 792 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (asserting that a speech-restrictive injunction is “at least” as deserving of strict
scrutiny as statutory restrictions). Scalia expounds on this argument in his dissent to
the denial of the second petition for certiorari in Williams v. Planned Parenthood
Shasta-Diablo, Inc. After the Supreme Court of California upheld the injunction at
issue, the defendants petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari. In light of the

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004

29

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
KEAST.DOC

302

9/16/2004 1:54 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 12:2

The Madsen plaintiffs’ initial complaint was that the protesters
blocked access to the clinic by demonstrating where the public street
gives access to the clinic.208 The original injunction accordingly
banned the defendants from blocking or interfering with public
access.209 In the proceedings to broaden the injunction, the court
found that, in numbers from a handful to four hundred, defendants
continued to impede access.210
In his Madsen dissent, Scalia agreed that the interests presented by
the Court were of the character the state may protect.211 He then
reminded the majority of its statement that an injunction issues only
on a past or imminent violation of statutory or common law, and he
argued that no state law or court order had been violated in
Madsen.212 The only violation even mentioned in the proceedings at
the Supreme Court was of the original injunction, which was issued in
response to defendants’ threats to illegally blockade the clinic.213
Scalia did not think even this had been violated: it enjoined
defendants from “blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress into or
egress from . . .” the clinic.214 Scalia noted that the state court, in
broadening the injunction, found that “there has been interference
with ingress to the petitioners’ facility . . . [in] the form of persons on
Madsen decision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
back to the California Supreme Court for reconsideration. The Supreme Court of
California upheld the judgment, the defendants appealed again, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. “It is not normally our practice to scrutinize the record
support for the grounds asserted by state courts or lower federal courts as a basis for
rejecting constitutional claims. We have, however, sometimes been disposed to do so
when the abridgement of First Amendment rights was at issue.” 520 U.S. 1133, 1136
(1997).
208. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758.
209. See id. at 757 (enjoining defendants from also physically abusing people
entering or leaving the clinic).
210. See id. at 758 (listing defendants’ acts as congregating in the street, marching
in the clinic’s driveways, engaging in “sidewalk counseling,” and making noise that
ranged from singing and chanting to the use of loudspeakers and bullhorns).
211. See id. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing as
state interests securing a woman’s freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling
services, ensuring public safety and order, protecting property rights, protecting
medical privacy rights and protecting the well-being of a patient held “‘captive’ by
medical circumstance”).
212. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
Court deferred too readily to the trial court in its conclusions that a law had been
violated).
213. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757 (recognizing constitutional issues surrounding
the injunction entered by the Florida Supreme Court).
214. See id. at 805 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the original injunction
prohibited trespassing or interfering with access to abortion clinics; physically abusing
those entering or leaving the clinics; and attempting or directing other persons to
take such actions).
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the paved portions . . . .” of the street in front of the clinic.215
Scalia also condemned the Court’s ready acceptance of the lower
court’s finding and berated the Court for what he deemed its failure
to perform its duty to examine closely the factual basis. Scalia relies
on Claiborne for this point. However, the Claiborne Court did not
revisit the lower courts’ findings of fact in order to ensure thorough
analysis. It did so because the lower courts did not articulate the
evidence they relied on in making those findings, thereby leaving the
Claiborne Court unable to apply the relevant facts to those
findings.216
Citing Meadowmoor Dairies, the Claiborne Court
emphasized that the Court has the ultimate power to search the
records in the state courts when the findings of fact are
“insubstantial.”217
As previously stated, Scalia denounced the Court’s failure to
examine the facts closely.218 He spent the first six pages of his dissent
recounting “the facts” as provided by a videotape provided by the
plaintiffs which documented the protesters’ activities.219 According
to Scalia’s observations, the protesters’ activities consisted of a “great
many forms of expression and conduct . . . includ[ing] singing,
chanting, praying, shouting . . . playing . . . music, speeches, peaceful
picketing . . . handbilling, persuasive speech directed at opposing
groups, efforts to persuade individuals not to have abortions, personal
testimony, [and] interviews with the press . . . .”220 However, Scalia
found that the protesters’ activities did not include any violent acts or
attempts to impede access to the clinic.221
Scalia appears to argue that, while one has the right to access, one
does not have the right to unimpeded access of abortion clinics.222
215. Id. at 806 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that petitioners were able to avoid
violating the original injunction while still impeding access to the clinic by using such
tactics as strategically picketing in front of the driveway leading to the abortion
clinic).
216. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 3430 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941)).
217. Id. at 3431.
218. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting Scalia’s opinion that the Court too
readily accepted the holding of the lower court).
219. See generally id. at 785-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing in detail the
videotape footage of the protest).
220. See id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the activity justifying the
amended injunction).
221. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that there was no suggestion that the
protesters used violence or impeded access to the clinic in the videotape or in the
trial court’s findings).
222. See id. at 812-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing reasonable alternative
restrictions that would impede access to clinics).
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Before providing for such unimpeded access, Scalia would seem to
require findings of violence, or of protesters’ intent to actually
prevent individuals from entering the clinic.223 Lacking such
findings, the original injunction itself would be invalid, and
disobedience to that order would not justify a broader injunction.224
Finally, Scalia argued that only in the context of abortion does the
Court expand legal doctrine, as in Madsen, to allow such a result.225
Rehnquist noted that the videotape was not the only evidence
before the the trial: the court also held three days of evidentiary
hearings.226
Rehnquist also seems to suggest that substantial
deference is appropriate because the defendants declined to put a full
factual record before the Court.227 Had the defendants done so, it is
unclear how much scrutiny Rehnquist would have given that
record.228
In Schenck, Rehnquist prefaced his deference to the trial court by
relating the factual details the trial court found.229 Scalia retorted
that Rehnquist simply was analyzing only what the lower court was
“entitled” to conclude, not what it actually did conclude.230
Accordingly, Scalia argued that the Court went beyond deferential
treatment to abdication in Madsen, substituting its own conclusions
about what burden was justified for those actually made by the lower
court.231
Lower courts appear to be using a very deferential standard in
reviewing factual findings. In U.S. v. Dinwiddie, the Eighth Circuit
223. See id. at 808 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the injunction refers to
intentionally blocking, impeding, or obstructing, and not to temporary obstructions
that occur as a normal consequence of protests).
224. See id. at 809 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment
protects those who unintentionally impede access to clinics).
225. See id. at 784-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting two other Supreme Court
Justices who believe that the Court has a history of treating issues regarding abortion
regulations differently from any other type of issue).
226. See id. at 770 (noting that the state court’s review of the facts included witness
testimony).
227. See id. at 770-71 (“[defendants] studiously refrained from challenging the
factual basis for the injunction . . . [they] argued against including the factual record
as an appendix in the Florida Supreme Court, and never certified a full record.”).
228. See id. at 771 (stating that the Court must judge the constitutionality of the
injunction based on the evidence and testimony available to the state court).
229. See 519 U.S. at 373 (adhering to the state court’s familiarity with the facts and
the background of the dispute).
230. See id. at 389 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court’s role is
not to conclude what decision the trial court should have reached).
231. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court chose to approve an
injunction that the District Court decided not to issue based on all of the facts of the
case).
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upheld an injunction pursuant to the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act barring the defendant from using “threats of force.”232
The appellate court set out the factors for analyzing whether a
statement constitutes a “threat of force”233 and then relied entirely on
the district court’s factual findings about the defendants’
statements.234 The Eighth Circuit, after quoting those findings,
upheld the district court’s judgment that the statements at issue did
constitute “threats of force.”235
The Eleventh Circuit also showed great deference to the district
court’s factual findings in Lucero, finding that that defendant’s
activity “violate[d] the nuisance law because it [was] harassing and
‘substantially interfere[d]’ with plaintiffs’ lawful activities on the
Clinic’s premises.”236 The Eleventh Circuit did not, however, review
those findings, apparently relying on the defendant’s brief to raise
questions about the facts if such questions existed.237 The court held
that defendants failed to give “any . . . coherent argument” as to how
the court had misapplied the law,238 and thus, the court declined to
review the district court’s application of the law to the facts.239
Similarly, the Second Circuit summarized and declined to review
the district court’s factual findings in United States v. Scott,240 and
stated that the district court “carefully tailored the expanded
injunction to address the particular facts of this case . . . .”241 The
dissenting judge reviewed the underlying facts solely to assess the
injunction’s enforceability based on the relevant widths and distances

232. 76 F.3d at 929 (upholding an injunction prohibiting the appellant from
engaging in a number of activities within 500 feet of an abortion clinic).
233. See id. at 925 (noting that statements constituting threats of force include
factors like the reaction of the recipient of the threat and of other listeners, whether
the threat was conditional, whether the threat was communicated directly to the
victim, whether the maker of the threat had made similar statements to the victim in
the past, and whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threats
had a propensity to engage in violence).
234. See id. (upholding the District Court’s findings based on the facts of the
case).
235. See id. (describing statements which the defendant made to an abortion
doctor as threats of force in light of the context in which they were made).
236. 121 F.3d 591, 599 (11th Cir. 1997).
237. See id. at n.12 (adhering to the defendant’s brief for the questions).
238. See id.
239. See id. (ignoring the district court’s interpretation of a distance law since the
defendants did not raise the issue).
240. 187 F.3d 282 (2nd Cir. 1999).
241. Id. at 289 (finding that the district court’s broadening of the injunction was
prudent and not overbroad).
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between physical structures.242
In short, while it is not always readily apparent from the appellate
decisions what “review of the record” means to each court, the level of
deference accorded to the trial courts’ factual findings is quite high,
even if the end result is to restrict free speech.
CONCLUSION
Scalia contends that expansive doctrines like that of Madsen,
Schenck, and Hill could only take place in the context of abortion,
because, to the Court’s majorities in those cases, “abortion is
different.”243 This raises a valid question: would the holdings in
Madsen, Schenck, and Hill be the same if the demonstrators being
enjoined were instead civil rights protesters in the 1960s?244 Perhaps
not, but the reason is not the viewpoint of the protesters. It is, quite
simply, that abortion is different.245 Scalia thinks this unacceptable,
but arguably free speech and protest in the context of health care
facilities where physicians perform abortions require special
treatment.246 White protesters trying to block African-Americans
from a previously “whites-only” lunch counter or union protesters
trying to block “scabs” from crossing the picket line surely affect many
of their targets emotionally and physically.247 However, abortion
demonstrations can emotionally and physically affect medical patients
about to undergo a variety of medical procedures, each not without
physical risk.248 The Supreme Court has found that medical
testimony supports the conclusion that high-stress situations, such as
passing through a vigorous demonstration outside the door of the
doctor’s office, can be dangerous to a patient’s health.249 The
constitution requires listeners to put up with some offensive speech in
242. See id. at 289-92 (reviewing the facts solely as they applied to the “floating
buffer zone”).
243. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 741-42 (noting the expansion of restrictions
surrounding the right to persuade women contemplating abortions to forego them).
244. See supra note 114 (comparing abortion protesters with civil rights
protesters).
245. See supra pages 278-82 (noting the expansive doctrine in the abortion cases).
246. See supra note 116 (noting that Scalia even gives credence to the idea that
abortion “is different”).
247. See id. (recognizing that varying levels of trauma result depending on the
context of the protest).
248. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting the medical risks associated
with patients exposed to abortion protests).
249. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758 (noting that many patients faced with protests can
manifest high levels of anxiety or hypertension, causing them to need higher levels of
sedation, which, in turn, increases the risk of the surgical procedures).
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order to protect the First Amendment; rights must, after all, be
balanced.250 But “balance” should not require a listener to put her
own health at risk so that another may speak freely.251
Madsen, Schenck and Hill have provided courts with some
guidance for drafting constitutionally sound injunctions governing
demonstrators.252 However, this attempt at guidance has created new
difficulties of its own. While currently still limited to abortion cases
and a few labor matters, as long as Americans value protest, the issues
raised in this paper inevitably will come up in suits outside this
context. Recognizing that abortion is “different” could limit the
prospective breadth of Madsen’s analysis on consideration of health
risks, but the Court has ruled out such precision by finding that
women seeking abortions are not a protected class.253 Barring the
precedent to support such precision, Madsen’s sweep could be broad
indeed.

250. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (setting forth the weighing of
interests in First Amendment analysis).
251. See supra pages 282-83 (explaining the balancing analysis used by the
Supreme Court in Madsen).
252. See supra pages 282-93 (noting the analysis in Madsen, Schenck, and Hill).
253. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993)
(observing that a “class” is something more than a group of people who engage in
similar conduct).
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